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REFORMING THE JAPANESE COMMERCIAL CODE: A
STEP TOWARDS AN AMERICAN-STYLE EXECUTIVE
OFFICER SYSTEM IN JAPAN?
Matthew Senechalt
Abstract: After more than a decade of attempting to remedy failing banks, rising
unemployment, and a shrinking economy, Japan has taken a new approach to economic
reform. With the hope of improving corporate profits and international competitiveness,
the Japanese Diet passed legislation in May 2002 amending the Commercial Code to
allow corporations to adopt an American-style executive officer system. The amendment
establishes a workable new framework for more effective corporate governance in Japan
and serves as an important early step in what promises to be a long road to reform. These
benefits notwithstanding, its impact will be limited by the Amendment's optional nature,
a preference for Japanese business practices, the persistence of weak, insider-dominated
boards of directors, and renewed suspicion of American corporate institutions following
the wave of American corporate scandals.
I. INTRODUCTION
After suffering from a moribund economy for more than a decade,'
Japan is desperate to escape its decade-long recession and restore corporate
2earnings. Japan's inability to recover from this prolonged economic
slowdown has led its business and political leaders to seek creative solutions
for reform of business practices on many levels. 3  However, efforts by
leaders in Tokyo to revive the economy by cutting interest rates, funding
massive public works projects, and instituting schemes to spur consumer
spending have all come up short.4  Moreover, "Big Bang" 5 reforms in
I The author would like to thank Professor Richard Kummert for his assistance and guidance on this
project and the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Editorial Staff for all of their time and effort. The author
would also like to thank Tomoko Miyao for her support and patience throughout the writing process.
Japan External Trade Organization, New Business Practices and Opportunities in the Japanese
Economy (Oct. 10, 2002), at http://www.jetro.go.jp/it/e/pub/bizpractices2OO2/gce2.html (last visited Jan.
28. 2003) [hereinafter New Business Practices].
' See Takashi Narusawa et al., Rebirth of Japanese Companies Through Governance Reforms,
Nomura Research Institute 2 (Apr. 1, 2001), at http://www.nri.co.jp/english/report/papers/2001/pdf/np
200125.pdf (last visited Feb. 24. 2003).
3 See, e.g., Marc Goldstein, A Rude Awakening in Japan, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2002, at A7;
Carla Rapoport, CFO, MAG. FOR SENIOR FIN. EXECUTIVES, July 1, 2002, at I (indicating a ten-year decline
in shareholder value).
4 Mark Poe et al., Revising the Japanese Commercial Code: A Summary and Evaluation of the
Reform Effort, 2 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 71 (2002).
This program of economic reform was announced by then-Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in
1997 and focuses on wide ranging reforms in key industries. Id. at 71 n.5. The program takes its name
from a 1986 British financial reform package which moderately stimulated the British economy. Id.
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industries such as banking, capital markets, and insurance 6 have largely
failed to turn the economy around.7
Many business and political leaders on both sides of the Pacific argue
that Japan's stagnant and scandal-ridden 8 economy is due in large part to its
poor corporate governance practices. 9 Bloated, insider-dominated boards of
directors 10 and ineffective corporate auditors are part of a corporate
governance scheme that fails to deliver accountability and profit to
shareholders in an increasingly competitive global economy." If Japan's
corporate governance practices are a source of its economic woes, the
Diet's 12 May 2002 amendment ("Amendment") to the Commercial Code 3
("Code"), providing Japanese corporations with the option to adopt an
American-style executive officer system, may provide a framework for a
more efficient and reliable system of corporate governance. 4 For legal and
cultural reasons, however, the Amendment alone will likely not create
systemic reform. The Amendment's optional nature, strong preference for
Japanese business practices, the persistence of certain cultural norms, and
renewed suspicion of American corporate institutions following the recent
wave of corporate scandals threaten to limit its overall effectiveness.
This Comment analyzes the Amendment's potential impact on Japan's
conventional corporate governance practices and argues that, although it is
6 Id. at71.
7 See World Economic Forum, How in the World Can Japan Compete? Revamping the Japanese
Model (Jan. 28, 2000), at http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/How/*20in%20t
he%20world%20can%o20Japan%20compete%3F%2ORevamping%20the%2OJapanese%20model (last
updated Dec. 26, 2002) (quoting Kenneth S. Courtis, Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs Asia at the 2000
annual meeting of the World Economic Forum as saying that Japan remains "trapped in the vicious jaw of
debt, deflation and demographics").
a See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 3, at A7 (discussing scandals in Japan's "insular food processing
industry" and linking those failures to poor corporate governance); Rapoport, supra note 3, at I (indicating
a ten-r'ear decline in shareholder value).
See, e.g., Reiji Yoshida, Japan Gropes for Ideal Corporate Governance Model, JAPAN TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2002, at 1, available at LEXIS, Asia/Pacific Rim, Current News File.
i Corporate Officer System Should Shake Up Complacent Boards, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 15, 1999, at
18.
1 See Holly J. Gregory, The Globalization of Corporate Governance, Wel, Gotshal & Manges LLP,
at http://rruworldbank.org/documents/the globalization-Of-corporategovemance.pdf (Jan. 13, 2002).
i2 The Diet is Japan's national legislature.
i3 The Japanese Commercial Code (Shoh6) provides for the incorporation of public stock
corporations (kabushiki-kaisha) and contains the basic laws governing their conduct. See generally SHOHO
[Commercial Code] (Japan). The original version of the Code was adopted at the close of the nineteenth
century. Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility: Dangerous and Harmful Though Maybe Not
Irrelevant, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1227, 1230 (1999). However, after World War II the Code was revised
under a strong American influence. Id.; see also Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate
Law; Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 528-29 (200 1)
(indicating that the Illinois Business Corporation Act was a particularly influential force during the Code's
post-war revision).
14 See Poe et al., supra note 4, at 75.
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an important step in creating substantive change in the way Japanese firms
are governed, a number of obstacles will limit its positive effects. Part II
identifies the principal-agent dilemma as the primary problem American-
style corporate governance seeks to address and analyzes how the executive
officer system is designed to limit its negative consequences. Part III
examines conventional Japanese corporate governance practices and then
briefly addresses some recent economic changes that expose them as
increasingly ineffective. Part IV surveys the Amendment's statutory
framework and Part V argues that while the Amendment serves as an
important step towards creating corporate governance reform in Japan,
several legal and cultural factors will severely limit its positive effects.
II. THE AMERICAN PARADIGM: PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS
In order to understand the impact that adopting an American-style
executive officer system may have on Japanese corporations, one must
understand both the problem the system is intended to address and how it is
designed to do so.1 5 American corporate law is primarily concerned with
limiting the harmful effects arising out of the asymmetry between
shareholder and executive interests.1 6 The executive officer system is a key
part of a system of structural checks intended to minimize those harmful
effects.
A. American Corporate Governance Seeks to Limit the Adverse Effects
of the Principal-Agent Model
The principal-agent relationship arising out of the separation of
corporate control 17 from its ownership 18 has long been identified as the
's Since the focus of this Part is on how American corporations are intended to operate, it relies on
the provisions of the American Law Institute's ("ALI's") PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, rather
than specific state corporation law. The PRINCIPLES are the product of the ALL's attempt to both restate and
recommend changes to the operation of American business corporations. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, President's Forward, at 6 (1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
16 Kevin Keasey et al., Introduction: The Corporate Governance Problem-Competing Diagnoses
and Solutions, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1-2 (Kevin Keasey et al. eds., 1997).
17 For the purposes of this Comment, the term "corporate control" refers to the active executive
management of the corporation, including:
(a) the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, and accounting officers of a
corporation; (b) to the extent not encompassed by the foregoing, the chairman of the
board of directors (unless the chairman neither performs a policymaking function other
than as a director nor receives a material amount of compensation in excess of director's
MARCH 2003
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primary source of executive misconduct 19 and the focus of American
corporate governance 20 Analysis of the nature of the corporate entity
illustrates the problem. At its core, a public corporation is governed by a
multilayered relationship between shareholders, directors and executives. 2'
The shareholders surrender the day-to-day management of the corporation to
executives who have the business expertise to manage it. 22  In turn, the
executives agree to run the corporation in the owners' interests by earning a
corporate profit and delivering shareholder gain.23 In order to ensure their
interests are addressed, shareholders elect a board of directors, which
independently and collegially oversees 24 the executives and sets broad
corporate policy.25  This relationship between the shareholders who want a
job done and the executives who are willing to do it is known as a principal-
agent relationship.2 6
When managers use their expertise to benefit shareholders, the system
works well, but it is not difficult to imagine how shareholder and executive
interests can diverge. Executives and others in control of the corporation
might be tempted to exploit their positions and engage in self-dealing
fees), president, treasurer, and secretary, and a vice-president or vice-chairman who is in
charge of a principal business unit, division, or function (such as sales, administration, or
finance) or performs a major policymaking function for the corporation; and (c) any other
individual designated by the corporation as an officer.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 1.27.
18 For the purposes of this Comment, the corporation's ownership refers to its shareholders.
19 Keasey et al., supra note 16, at 1-2.
20 Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract Culture and
the Rule ofLaw, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3, 18-19 (1996) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Relational Theory].
21 Corporate governance may be defined broadly as the systems that govern a corporation's
behavior, including all of the formal and informal relationships surrounding the corporate sector as well as
their consequences for society in general. See Keasey et al., supra 16, at 1-2. In a narrower sense, the term
may simply refer to the formal systems that ensure management accountability to shareholders. See Id.
For the purposes of this Comment, the term corporate governance shall refer to the latter definition, but will
also make reference to some of the cultural norms that bear on the application of those structures.
22 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, CASES AND
MATERIALS 147 (8th ed. 2000); PRINCIPLES supra note 15, § 3.02 cmts. a, d (indicating that although most
state business statutes literally seem to require the board to directly manage the company, it is "widely
understood that the board of a publicly held corporation normally cannot and does not perform those
functions in the usual sense of those terms;" rather, it operates more as a collegial oversight body with
respect to the officers).
23 PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 2.01(a).
24 The board's oversight function is not usually carried out directly by actively supervising the
principal senior executives, but rather indirectly by evaluating the performance of those executives and
taking actions to replace those officers that fail to meet reasonable job performance expectations. See
PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 3.02 cmt. d.
25 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 3.01 cmits. a-c.
26 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958); Keasey et al., supra note 16, at 3 (indicating that
this conception of the corporation serves as the dominant American paradigm).
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transactions that benefit themselves, rather than shareholders.27 Limiting
these so-called agency costs in an attempt to ensure the accountability of
management to shareholders is the primary policy behind United States
corporate- and securities-related laws. 28
B. The Executive Officer System: Maximizing Accountability and
Efficiency in the Principal-Agent Paradigm
Together with several other control mechanisms, 29 the executive
officer system 30 is one of the fundamental features of modem American
corporate governance. 3 1 Executive officers are a corporate organ separate
from the board of directors and are delegated authority by the board to
carry out the corporation's day-to-day business.33 As such, officers can be
removed by directors 34 and are subject to the board's general oversight and
business policy objectives. 3 Officers are therefore subordinate to and
independent of the board of directors.36 As a result of this separation, the
board is able to objectively and collegially oversee the executives in the
interests of shareholders. 37 Additionally, the system facilitates more
27 Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American
Corporations, 49 AM. J. COMP. L., 317, 329-330 (1998).
23 Michael Bradley et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and Accountability of
The Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9, 57 (1999); Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 18-19.
" This Comment does not attempt to catalogue the myriad ways that corporations can and are
governed. Rather, this Comment briefly addresses some of the major methods of American corporate
governance mechanisms in order to demonstrate that the executive officer system does not simply act
alone. See Alistair Bruce & Trevor Buck, Executive Reward and Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 80-82 (Kevin Keasey et al. eds., 1997) (indicating that each of the various control methods
reflects the underlying tension of the principal-agent relationship).
" The executive officer system may be characterized as a direct control mechanism. See Brad
Glosserman, Progress or Perish: Just Say Yes To Corporate Governance, THE JOURNAL, American
Chamber of Commerce Japan, at 2 (Nov. 2000), at http://www.accj.or.jp/lib/docs/00.11.progress
orperish.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2003). These corporate governance mechanisms refer to the oversight
and interventional functions of parties that have vested interests in the corporation. See ld. Also, they rely
heavily on the autonomy and independence of the corporation's constituent organs See Mary F. Kiqsane,
Global Gadflies: Applications and Implications of U.S.-Style Corporate Governance Abroad, 17 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'LCOMP. L. 621, 626 (1997).
31 See Kissane, supra note 30, at 626.
32 Compare PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 3.01 with PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 3.02.
33 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 3.01.
'4 See id. § 3.02(a).
35 See id. § 3.02(b).
36 Misao Tatsuta & Richard 0. Kummert, Japanese and U.S. Business Corporation Law Vol. I, 5-17
(1996) (unpublished course materials) (on file with the University of Washington School of Law).
37 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 3.02 cmt. d. The effectiveness of this separation has been called
into question in the wake of the Enron collapse and other recent corporate scandals in America. See, e.g.
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efficient decision-making because officers are free to make operational
decisions without being forced to consult another layer of authority. 38 Given
the distinct roles granted to the executive officers and board of directors,39
these two corporate organs must be implemented together in order to reap
their operational and oversight benefits. 0
Indirect control mechanisms 4' such as the stock market and the
possibility of takeover suplement the direct controls4 2 afforded by the
executive officer system. 3 The liquidity of American stock markets
44
enables investors to easily allocate their capital to corporations that provide
the best risk-adjusted returns. 45 Since a corporation's share price
theoretically reflects the performance of executive management, rational
shareholders will demand a change in strategy, sell their interests or attempt
to remove executive management when profits fall.46 Similarly, the threat of
a leveraged buy-out or other takeover measure indirectly creates incentives
for corporate executives to maximize corporate performance or face being
ousted.47
Another increasingly common 48 method of corporate control is
through the use of executive pay incentives, including stock options. 49 By
tying an executive's pay to the price of a corporation's stock, the executive's
interests and motivations are thought to be more closely aligned with those
of the shareholders.50  The use of stock incentives has become particularly
popular over the course of the last two decades,51 though the recent
Jeffery N. Gordon, Closing Remark: What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern
Business Corporation. Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1245 (2002).
3S See PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, § 3.01 cmt. a (indicating that the executives manage the bulk of
the corporation's day-to-day operational functions).
39 See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
40 Tatsuta & Kummert, supra note 36, at 5-17.
4' These are generally characterized as market based corporate goemance control mechanisms. See
Glosserman, supra note 30, at 2.
42 d.
4 Additional mechanisms to ensure management oversight include, among other things, shareholder
suits and information disclosure rights. See Pinto, supra note 27, at 329-30, 336-40.
4 See Mike Wright et al., Venture Capitalists, Buy-Outs and Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 147 (Kevin Keasey et al. eds., 1997).
41 See ROBERT A. HAUGEN MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 202-04 (4th ed. 1997)46 Pinto, supra note 27, at 329-30.
47 See id. at 335-37; see also Wright et al., supra note 44, at 147-48, 152-55 (describing the
characteristics of leveraged buy-outs of publicly traded corporations and arguing that, in the event of
takeover, the result is likely to be improved performance and re-focused executive management).
48 Bruce & Buck, supra note 29, at 87.
49 See Gordon, supra note 37, at 1245.
'o See id.
51 Bruce & Buck, supra note 29, at 87.
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American corporate scandals have prompted a serious reassessment of their
effectiveness and desirability.52
American corporations are thus governed by a system designed to
maximize shareholder value and limit agency costs by harnessing the self-
interests of autonomous corporate actors.53 Separating the board of directors
from the executive officers is an essential part of this corporate governance
system and is further supported by a number of market forces and the use of
executive pay incentives. With the American model growing increasingly
dominant in the global economy, 54 nations that employ markedly different
corporate governance models are under increased pressure to adopt the
American model or a competitive alternative. 55 This is particularly true in
56the case of Japan.
III. PROSPERITY, RECESSION, AND THE PETRIFICATION OF JAPAN'S
CONVENTIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL
Despite similar theoretical starting points57 and some similarities in
statutory form,58 Japanese corporations currently tend to employ a corporate
governance model 59 that is markedly different from the model of their
American counterparts. 60 The absence of a separate executive officer organ,
together with a too-powerful chief executive and inadequate statutory
auditors 6' creates a corporate governance system that provides few controls
52 See generally John Cassidy, The Greed Cycle, NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002 (discussing the
history of the use of stock options in American corporations and their relationship to the recent wave of
American corporate scandals).
53 See Kissane, supra. note 30, at 624-25.
54 See Craig LaChance, Nature v. Nurture: Evolution, Path Dependence and Corporate Governance,
18 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279 (2001) (discussing the potential convergence of corporate governance
practices into a uniform global standard); but see West, supra note 13, at 589 (arguing that complete, near
term convergence of corporate governance norms is unlikely).
55 See Japan External Trade Organization, Japan 's Changing Economic Laws & Regulations, Oct.
28, 2002, at http://www.jetro.go.jp/it/e/pub/changing2OOl/5_1.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter
Japan's Changing Laws].
56 Makoto Komiyama & Yukinobu Masaoka. Corporate Governance, A New Phase for Japanese
Companies 2, Nomura Research Institute, at http://www.nri.co.jp/english/report/papers/2002/pdf/np200
247.pdf (May 1, 2002).
57 West, supra note 13, at 529.
5s Id.
59 Hereinafter, this Comment will refer to this as Japan's conventional corporate governance model.
60 Nevertheless, Japanese corporations are similarly vulnerable to the fundamental problems inherent
to the corporate form. See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Law Symposium, Reform in Japanese Corporate
Law and Corporate Governance: Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 654
(200 1. Statutory auditors are a corporate supervisory organ unique to Japan and designed to audit and
oversee the board of directors. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
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on executive action and little emphasis on shareholders. 62 Moreover,
corporate norms emphasizing hierarchy and community further undermine
the possibility of effective oversight.63 Although robust economic growth
and a unique system of industrial organization enabled this system to survive
for decades, Japan's recent recession and an unwinding of cross-
shareholding patterns render it increasingly ineffective. 64  Consequently,
Japan faces mounting pressure to provide an alternative model.
A. Japan's Conventional Corporate Governance Model Provides Weak
Oversight and Affords Few Shareholder Protections
One of Japan's most distinctive corporate governance features, and a
chief source of its inability to effectively oversee executives, is the
combination of executive and board functions. Unlike American corporate
law, the Code does not provide for executive officer positions.65 Instead, it
is common for corporations to confer on its directors titles that Americans
typically associate with executive officers.66 Executive titles therefore do
not relate to executive officers as a separate body, but rather to sitting board
members that hold concurrent officer titles. This arrangement frustrates the
separation of operational and oversight powers contemplated by the
American model, essentially leaving the board to oversee itself.
67
The concentrated power of the board's representative director further
limits its oversight ability and thwarts deliberative decision-making
processes. 68 The Code requires Japanese boards to appoint from its
members at least one "representing director" ("daihyo torishimariyaku")69 to
act on the behalf of the corporation and to represent it regarding most
external matters. 70 To this end, the representative director has broad power
62 Takashi Araki, Employees and Corporate Governance. Japan. A Comparative Analysis:
Corporate Governance and Labor and Employment Relations in Japan, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 67,
77-78 (2000); see also Japan's Changing Laws, supra note 55.
63 See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of Corporate Law
and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 213-14, (2000).
6 See infra notes 98-108 and 120-26 and accompanying text.
65 Nevertheless, virtually all Japanese corporations provide for them in their articles of incorporation.
I DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 9.07(2) (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1996).
66 See Miwa, supra note 13, at 1231.
67 Araki, supra note 62, at 91.
6' RODNEY CLARK, THE JAPANESE COMPANY 100 (1979) (indicating that the hierarchical nature of
Japanese boards of directors in general stands as a barrier to "critical discussion").
69 SHOHO [Commercial Code] art. 261, para. 1 (Japan) (representing director is often also referred to
in the literature as a "representative director"; that is the term used herein).
70 Koji MATSUMOTO, THE RISE OF THE JAPANESE CORPORATE SYSTEM; THE INSIDE VIEW OF A MITI
OFFICIAL 7 (Thomas 1. Elliot trans., Kegan Paul International Ltd. 1993) (1983).
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to act in all "judicial and extra-judicial acts relating to the business of the
corporation.'
The representative director's power, however, is much broader than
the letter of the Code indicates. In reality, the representative director
typically directs the internal operational policies of the corporation, 72
appoints and removes the other directors,73 and sits as the chairman of the
board.7 a Since the representative director is generally considered the highest
position in the corporation, virtually no other corporate actor can challenge
his authority. 75 It is equally unlikely that the representative director could be
76
removed for poor performance. Consequently, the representative director,
not the board as a whole, determines the corporation's day-to-day business,77
serves as its key management figure,78 and is functionally accountable to no
one.
79
The insider nature of Japanese boards also serves as a substantial
impediment to their ability to serve shareholder interests and ensure
executive accountability. Japanese boards typically consist of insiders
promoted from the company's senior and middle management. 80 Indeed, the
title of director carries great prestige within the company hierarchy 81 and is
therefore virtually impossible to award to company outsiders.8 2 Since nearly
all executive officers and directors are elected from the ranks of corporate
71 SHOHO [Commercial Code] art. 261, para. 3 (Japan).
72 MATSUMOTO, supra note 70, at 7.
73 Kazuo Noda, Big Business Organization in Part Two Economic Organization, in MODERN
JAPANESE ORGANIZATION AND DECISION-MAKING 120-21 (Ezra F. Vogel ed., 1975).
74 Id. at 122.
75 MATSUMOTO, supra note 70, at 9.
76 Id. (indicating that, in such instances, it is more likely that a director who made such a suggestion
would be removed instead).
77 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 65, § 9.07(7).
71 See Tatsuta & Kummert, supra note 36, at 5-16 (1996).
79 MATSUMOTO, supra note 70. at 9. Additionally, a few senior directors, possibly in coniunction
with the representative director, may dominate a particular board. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Symposium
Norms & Corporate Law: Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese
Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2083, 2091 (2001) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Symposium].
go Ordinarily, the board is comprised of a chairman and the heads of the firm's various departments.
TOYOHIRO KONO, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES 23 (1984).
81 As many as four distinct ranks of directors may exist within any particular board, each of which is
subordinate to the representative director. See CLARK, supra note 68, at 99-103.
42 Some argue that the insular nature of the board shields it from the pressures of ownership and
enables it to focus on long-term growth for the benefit of the employees at the expense of short-term profit.
See KONO, supra note 80, at 23; but see Bradley et al., supra note 28, at 57 (indicating that one exception
may be main bank representatives that sit as board members ofkeiretsu firms with whom they do business).
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insiders, their loyalty is first to their company peers and second to larger
stakeholders, including shareholders.
83
Japan's last supervisory line of defense, the unique statutory auditor
system, also fails to serve as an effective mechanism to prevent executive
abuse or safeguard shareholder interests. The Code requires Japanese
corporations to employ one or more84 statutory auditors ("kansayaku") to
"audit the execution by the directors of their functions. ' 85 However, the
statutory auditor system is widely recognized as a weak supervisory organ
86
that has "had little real function" since its inception in 1896.87 One key
weakness of the statutory auditors is that their power is narrowly defined to
cover only legal compliance and accounting functions. 88 They do not have a
vote on the board nor are they charged with the responsibility of monitoring
the overall performance of management. 89 Moreover, auditors tend to be
retired employees or employees of affiliated firms who are given the title as
a token of appreciation." As a result, auditors are generally considered to
have lower stature within the corporate hierarchy, which stands as a serious
impediment to their performance of even basic monitoring and compliance
functions.
91
These Japanese practices and structures result in a corporate
governance system that is far different than its American analogue.
Whereas American corporations rely on a clear separation of board and
executive officer functions, Japanese firms combine the two and concentrate
decision-making power in the hands of a representative director.
Additionally, weak statutory authority and social norms prevent auditors
from exercising any truly effective oversight. The result is a corporate
83 See Shishido, supra note 63, at 213 (arguing that when performance is weak, internal social
pressures from the "Company Community" force failing executives to resign or be removed and, thus, that
all members of the firm have an incentive to ensure economic success).
84 For large corporations (whose capital is five hundred million yen or more or whose total liabilities
are one hundred million yen or more) at least three statutory auditors are required. See DOING BUSINESS IN
JAPAN, supra note 65, § 9.08(1).
85 SHOHO [Commercial Code] art. 274 (Japan). To this end, auditors are granted a variety of
investigative and reporting functions. DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 65, § 9.08(2). For instance,
directors must report to the auditor problems that might cause serious harm to the corporation. SH6I.I
[Commercial Code] arts. 274-72 (Japan). Auditors also have the power to request at any time that the
directors report on the operation of the company. Id. art. 274, para. 2. They may also demand that a
director cease any act that is ultra vires or otherwise in violation of the law. Id. art. 275-72.
86 See Noda, supra note 73, at 118-20.
's Id. at 119.
88 Araki, supra note 62, at 77-78.
89 See generally SHOHO [Commercial Code] arts. 273-80 (Japan).
90 Michael Solomon Associates, Inc., Commercial Code Revisions Strengthen Board Oversight Role,
1 JAPAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 1 (July 2002) http://www.msapr.corn/JCGR%20July%20
English.pdf. (last visited Jan. 5, 2003).
91 MATSUMOTO, supra note 70, at 9-10.
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governance model in which executive oversight and shareholder interests
appear to be almost a total fiction.
92
B. Economic Changes Expose the Weaknesses of Japan's Conventional
Corporate Governance Model
Although a unique combination of industrial organization and
economic success throughout much of the post-war period may have
enabled Japan's conventional corporate governance model to persist,
domestic recession, unwinding of cross-shareholdings, and competition in
an increasingly global economy are pressuring Japan to change. Japan's
ongoing recession has led to an unwinding of cross-shareholding patterns,
which has both opened the door to more activist foreign shareholders and
forced more Japanese firms to compete directly with foreign firms for
capital.94 Since global investors increasingly view corporate governance as
a key investment criterion, 95 Japan is being pushed to reassess the viability
of its conventional model.96
1. Industrial Organization and Economic Success Allowed Japan's
Conventional System to Persist, Despite Its Deficiencies
Japan's unique forms of industrial organization and astounding post-
war economic success are chief reasons the conventional corporate
governance system persists.97 For instance, one of the hallmarks of Japanese
industry is the organization of many Japanese corporations into groups
92 Id. at 9.
93 See Japan External Trade Organization, Bringing in Outsiders to Oversee Management, at
http://www.jetro.org/newyork/info-onjapan/jetroreports/corpgov.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2003)
[hereinafter Bringing in Outsiders].
94 Id.; see also Narusawa et al., supra note 2, at 10.
'5 See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 11, at 2.
96 According to Tomomi Yano, manager of Japan's Pension Fund Association, "[t]he biggest
problem [with Japanese companies] is inadequate oversight. For the market to improve, we need to
improve the profitability of each corporation, and we won't be able to accomplish that without reforming
[corporate] governance structures." Michael Solomon Associates, Inc., Interview with Tomomi Yano of the
Pension Fund Association, 3 JAPAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2, (2002)
http://www.msapr.com/English%20JCGReport%20November.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) [hereinafter
Interview with Tomomi Yano].
97 A number of commentators have analyzed the Japanese system and found it to have many
strengths, including the freedom of Japanese firms to set long term goals without being overly burdened by
pressures to deliver short term gains. See, e.g. Howard D. Sherman & Andrew Babcock, Redressing
Structural Imbalances in Japanese Corporate Governance, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
AND FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 267-68 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997); see generally JAMES C.
ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION (1985) (positively evaluating
many facets of Japanese management).
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called keiretsu.98 These keiretsu are characterized by "stable cross-share
ownership, interlocking directorates, extensive product market exchanges,
and other linkages that enhance group identity and facilitate information
exchange." 99 Frequently, these groups are centered around a main bank that
holds various member company shares and provides capital and other types
of assistance. 0 0 Indeed, approximately two-thirds of all corporate shares in
Japan are held in these kinds of stable, management-friendly
arrangements. 
0 1
A negative result of these keiretsu cross-shareholding arrangements,
however, is management inattention to shareholder interests. 102 Because
corporations will maintain their cross shareholdings in order to preserve
keiretsu business relationships, regardless of share performance,' 0 3 directors
have little real reason to fear losing their jobs for poor performance, '04
except in times of serious trouble. 0 5 The almost unwavering faith of inside
shareholders in established executive management is further evidenced by
the practice by institutional shareholders of submitting blank proxy
statements at annual shareholder meetings. 106 In this way, inside
shareholders show little regard to the performance of executive management
and instead tend to follow its lead. 107 Ultimately, cross-shareholding
arrangements elevate the relationship of the majority shareholders at the
expense of other shareholders and render attention to shareholder value a
low priority. 1
08
Japan's astounding post-war economic success compounded these
trends. After decades of growth, by 1990, Japan had emerged as the world's
second largest economy 109 and seemed to be "an unstoppable economic
'8 Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 25-26.
99 Id,
'00 Bradley et al., supra note 28, at 57; see also Sherman & Babcock, supra note 97, at 267-68.
101 Milhaupt, supra note 20, at 25-26. Keiretsu also serve as an anti-takeover device, as well as a
method for providing corporate monitoring and bonding. Id.; see also Miwa, supra note 13, at 1231
(indicating that shareholders rarely oust management).
02 Poe et al., supra note 4, at 77-78.
03 MATSUMOTO, supra note 70, at 5.
104 id.
105 Glosserman, supra note 30, at 1.
106 Id. at 5-6. The use of general meeting mongers or sokaiya, who are paid to suppress dissent and
over-inquisitiveness during shareholder meetings is also not uncommon. CLARK, supra note 68, at 102-03.
MATSUMOTO, supra note 70, at 6.
:08 Poe, et al., supra note 4, at 78.
09 See Japan External Trade Organization, Japanese Economy Offers Investors a Source of Global
Diversity (July 29, 2002), at http://www.jetro.org/newyork/focusnewletter/focusl9.htn-l (last visited Feb.
23, 2003).
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machine on the road to dominating the world economy."" 0 Throughout this
period of prosperity, as long as employees and other stakeholders benefited
and returns on shares held by insiders were sufficient, shareholder interests
were subordinated and conflicts between management and shareholders
were simply overlooked."' Thus, Japanese inside shareholders and business
leaders were indifferent to the system's deficiencies as long as Japan was
prosperous.
2. Recent Economic Pressures Demand Reform of Japan's Conventional
Corporate Governance Model
Although Japan's conventional corporate governance model seemed
to serve its corporations exceptionally well for decades, 112 it has been
increasingly viewed as the source of economic failure 113 and corporate
scandal 14 ever since the bursting of the economic bubble." 5 A decade-long
recession has instigated an unwinding of cross-shareholdings, which has in
turn led to the growth of foreign investment in Japan and enhanced
competition for direct capital financing. 116 These changes are forcing Japan
to address the viability of its conventional corporate governance practices
more than ever before.' 17
One key reason for Japan's inability to ignore reform of its
conventional corporate governance practices is the rapid unwinding of cross-
shareholding patterns. 118 As Japan's recession drags on, corporations
increasingly feel pressure to improve their bottom lines. 19 More and more,
corporations have shown a willingness to sell off cross-shareholdings in
non-performing companies. 120 Indeed, cross-shareholdings accounted for
45% of shares held a decade ago, whereas they accounted for just 34.1% by
2001.121 Moreover, recent changes to Japan's corporate accounting rules are
likely to create an even greater incentive for corporations to sell their poorly
"1o GERALD L. CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS: LEADERS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE LIMITS
OF CHANGE 72 (1999).
I See Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93.
1 See discussion supra Part Ill. B. 1.
: See, e.g., Glosserman, supra note 30, at 1.
4 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 3; Rapoport, supra note 3.115 This term refers to the stock market bubble and inflated land prices of the late 1980s.
See Bringing In Outsiders, supra note 93.
117 Komiyama & Masaoka, supra note 56, at 2.
118 Id.
119 See id.
:20 Araki, supra note 62, at 71.
2 Glosserrnan, supra note 30, at 3.
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performing shareholdings. 122 As a result, Japanese firms must increasingly
compete directly against foreign firms for capital financing. 123 With
corporate governance topping the concerns of international investors,
124
Japanese companies are under increasing pressure to provide investors a
corporate governance system that provides accountability and continuous
profit. 125 In short, they must become more focused on providing shareholder
value. 126
Concurrently, the influence of more activist foreign investors in Japan
has grown significantly over the past several years.1 27 Between 1990 and
1998 alone, the ratio of foreign to domestic shareholders among
corporations listed on the Tokyo Stock exchange more than doubled. 128
Similarly, foreign mergers and acquisitions set a new record in Japan in
2001 for the fourth straight year, indicating growing acceptance of foreign
business alliances. 29 The result of this trend is that even Japanese firms that
raise capital domestically are feeling pressure to devise executive
management structures that generate the continuous profit growth expected
by foreign shareholders.13
0
Recognizing and adapting to these new economic realities is a critical
issue for Japanese companies if they are to successfully compete in an
increasingly global economy that demands accountability in corporate
governance. 3  According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, ("OECD"), "good corporate governance .. . ensures
transparency, fairness and accountability ... [and] is a prerequisite for the
integrity and credibility of market institutions."' 132 The growing importance
of corporate governance was highlighted at the 1998 meeting of the then G-
122 These new rules require that shares be assessed at their more volatile market value rather than
their book value. Poe et al., supra note 4, at 77.
123 See Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93.
124 See Gregory, supra note 11.
125 See Komiyama & Masaoka, supra note 56, at 2.
126 Poe et al., supra note 4, at 77.
127 See Komiyama & Masaoka, supra note 56, at 2.
121 See Hiroyuki Takahashi, Corporate Governance In Japan: Reform of Top Corporate Management
Structure, JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE 7 (July 23, 1999), at http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR99/9928A.pdf
(last visited Jan. 5, 2003).
129 It is possible to infer from such trends that the acceptability of foreign corporate governance
methods may also be met with increasing acceptance. See New Business Practices, supra note 1.
130 See Komiyama & Masaoka, supra note 56, at 2. The growing influence of such activist foreign
investors may also be influencing domestic institutional investors. According to Tomomi Yano of Japan's
Pension Fund Association, Japanese pension fund investors are becoming increasingly vociferous of their
shareholder interests. See Interview with Tomomi Yano, supra note 96.
i3i See Komiyama & Masaoka, supra note 56, at 2; see also Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93.
32 Bill Witherell, Corporate Governance and Responsibility Foundations of Market Integrity, 234
OECD OBSERVER 8 (Oct. 2002), at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00036000/M00036447.pdf (last visited Feb.
11,2003).
VOL. 12 No. 2
REFORMING THE JAPANESE COMMERCIAL CODE
7 leading industrialized nations, where corporate governance was identified
as one of the key pillars of the emerging global economy.'1 33 Since that time,
international organizations, including OECD, have been developing
international standards for corporate governance. 134 Although Japan's
corporate governance practices continue to fall short of international
standards, 135 the recent Amendment to the Code enabling Japanese
corporations to adopt an American-style executive officer system is a key
step towards substantive reform.
IV. THE AMENDMENT
Responding to these pressures, the Diet passed the Amendment to
enable Japanese corporations to adopt an American-style executive officer
system in May 2002.136 The Amendment expands on the Code's previous
provisions by creating at least two distinct corporate governance options for
Japanese firms. Companies can either maintain the conventional system,
subject to several modifications, or move entirely to an American-style
system, including officers and a board of directors with three committees.137
A. Pre-Amendment Corporate Governance: Adoption of American-Style
Executive Officer Systems
Pre-Amendment action by Japanese corporations reveals much about
the Amendment's form and potential impact. Prior to the Amendment, there
was simply no Code provision that enabled firms to adopt the executive
officer system. 138 Rather, Japanese firms were simply left to employ the
conventional governance system. 139 Nevertheless, many of Japan's leading
133 Glosserman, supra note 30, at 2.
134 See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (adopted May 1999), http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00008000fM00008299.pdf
(last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
135 According to a 2002 study by the Japan Corporate Governance Index Research group, Japanese
firms score especially low in category two of the Index, "Structure and Function of the Board of Directors."
See, Takaki Wakasugi et al., Report on the 2002 Corporate Governance Survey, JAPAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INDEX RESEARCH GROUP 5 (Sept. 2, 2002), http://www.jcgr.org/eng/research/
report2002O902eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2003) [hereinafter JCGI]. Scores in this category were on
average just 7.3 out of 29 total possible points, a result the study found indicates that the "functions of the
board of directors and operating officers have not yet been sufficiently separated." Id.
136 See Araki, supra note 62, at 91 n.60.
137 See discussion supra Part III.B.
138 However, no provision in the Commercial Code specifically prohibited the use of executive
officers either. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.139 See discussion supra Part III.
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multinational firms adopted the system before the Code even provided for
it. 140 Foremost among these corporate governance pioneers was Sony,
whose 1997 corporate reforms included the adoption of an executive officer
system. 14 1 This highly publicized change was extremely influential in the
Japanese business community and resulted in similar changes by almost two
hundred other major Japanese corporations, including Toshiba Corp., Japan
Airlines, and Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. 142 Many of the structures adopted by
these corporations, including the executive officer system, are now
embodied in the Amendment. 143 Thus, the actions of these pioneering firms
seemed to play an important role in passing the Amendment.
Pre-Amendment adoption of the executive officer system also
indicates that the Amendment's impact will be rapid. Demand pull reforms
are changes to the Code that are instigated by underlying changes in
Japanese corporate practices, the background economic market, and social
norms. 144 These business-driven reforms tend to have a direct influence on
corporate practices and, because they are driven by business exigencies, are
generally adopted quickly. 145 Several surveys indicate this is the case with
the Amendment. According to a 2001 survey conducted by the Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, 146 35.7% of the companies surveyed had "already
introduced an executive officer system," while an additional 14.1% were
"studying its [possible] introduction." 14 7 According to a survey reported by
the Asahi Shimbun, 148 however, by May 2002, only 6% of responding
corporations intended to adopt the American-style system. 149 These results
indicate that the bulk of corporations planning to utilize the system had
already done so by the time the Amendment passed.
140 See Takahashi, supra note 128. Hiroyuki Takahashi has compiled a table listing several of the
most well-known Japanese companies that have adopted an American-style system. Id. at 3.
141 Id. at 7; Takahashi discusses in greater detail the specific changes involved in Sony's reforms. Id.
at 4-5.
142 Milhaupt, Symposium, supra note 79, at 2117-18; see also Takahashi, supra note 128, at 3.
43 Compare Takahashi, supra note 128, at 9 (discussing Sony's introduction of executive officers
and a board system implementing three committees) with discussion infra Part IV.B. (discussing nearly
identical features embodied in ihe Commercial Code).
:44 Shishido, supra note 60, at 671-72.
" Id. at 671-74.
116 Nihon Keizai Shimbun is one of Japan's leading business newspapers.
14' The total of these two groups was almost 50% of respondents. Komiyama & Masaoka, supra note
56, at 4.
"' Asahi Shimbun is one of Japan's leading daily newspapers.
"9 External Directors Seen As Key To Investor Confidence, ASAHI SHIMBUN, May 21, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 20828790.
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B. The Amendment. Corporate Governance Options Are a Step Towards
an American-Style Executive Officer System
The Amendment contemplates at least two distinct corporate
governance 150 schemes which corporations can select based on their
particular business needs. 5 1 The first option is the conventional Japanese
model, employing the board of directors, no separate executive body, and
the statutory auditors. 152 For corporations that choose to retain the
conventional system, the Amendment requires certain modifications that
strengthen the role of the statutory auditors. 53 These modifications require
that large corporations have at least three auditors with a majority of them
being "outside" auditors. 154  The Amendment defines "outside" as those
auditors who have not "been a director, general manager or an employee in
some other capacity of the company or its subsidiaries."' 55 Additionally, the
Amendment enables firms that retain the modified conventional system to
create an Important Assets Committee within the board of directors "as a
minimal system to enhance operational efficiency." 116 However, it is
unclear exactly what purpose or effect such a committee would have on
corporate governance.157
Alternatively, the Amendment offers the option of implementing an
executive officer system substantially similar to the American model.' 58 A
corporation with more than two outside directors may elect to abandon the
conventional system entirely and replace it with an American-style officer
system.' 59 Corporations opting for the new system must install at least one
executive officer to focus primarily on the corporation's operational
affairs. 160 Officers are appointed by the board of directors 161 and are
150 See Japan's Changing Laws, supra note 55 (providing a useful, basic illustration of the
differences between these two systems).
"i See Motomi Hashimoto, Commercial Code Revisions: Promoting the Evolution of Japanese
Companies, NOMURA RESEARCH INSTITUTE 10 (May 1, 2002), at http://www.nri.co.jp/english/report/
papers/2002/pdf/np200248.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
152 See discussion supra Part III.
153 Bringing in Outsiders. supra note 93, at 3; see also Torikai Law Office, Review of the Law 44
Amendment (Nov. 12, 2002), at http://www.torikai.gr.jp/ (Hirosuke Yanagida, trans.) [hereinafter Torikai
Review].
:54 Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93, at 3.
155 See id. (indicating that these requirements are in addition to a December 2001 amendment to the
Commercial Code extending the length of auditor terms from three to four years).
156 See Torikai Review, supra note 153.
157 See id.
'58 See discussion supra Part n.B.
159 See Torikai Review, supra note 153.
:60 See Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93.
'61 See Torikai Review, supra note 153.
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delegated a number of the operational responsibilities previously held by the
board-officers, including selling and purchasing important corporate
assets, 162 opening and closing branch offices, 16' and approving stock
splits.1 64 Officers are also obliged to report to the shareholders at the annual
meeting, to the board every quarter, and to the auditing committee with
respect to major issues facing the company. 165 In short, officers are
specifically charged with conducting the corporation's day-to-day business
operations.'66 Thus, the Amendment more clearly separates the authority of
the management oversight organ, the directors, from the operational
executive organ, the officers, in much the same way as the American model.
It is important to note, however, that the separation contemplated by
the new scheme is not entirely distinct. Directors can still serve
concurrently as executive officers. 67 In fact, the Amendment requires at
least one director to serve as the corporation's chief executive officer
("CEO"). 168 Additionally, the statutory definition of "outside" does not
appear to apply to executive officers or to individuals from parent
corporations or other affiliated corporations. 169 Moreover, the term
"outside" does not seem to apply to individuals with other financial interests
in the corporation. 
70
Corporations installing the American-style executive officer system
must also adopt a board of directors with three committees. In addition to
requiring at least two outside directors to sit on the board, 17 2 the Amendment
requires the creation of appointment, compensation and auditing
committees. 173 The appointment committee will be empowered to select and
dismiss board members, while the compensation committee will be charged
162 id.
163 Id.
164 id.
165 id.
:66 Poe et al., supra note 4, at 86.
67 See Torikai Review, supra note 153 (indicating that an exception to this provision is that members
of the Auditing Committee may not be executive officers or chief managers of the corporation or its
subsidiaries).
168 See Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93.
169 See id. at 3.
170 See id.; Gordon, supra note 37, 1241-43 (identifying less formal relationships and side payments
as forces corrupting executive and director independence and leading, at least in part, to the Enron
collapse). The ambiguities in the Amendment leave the door open to allowing these types of less formal
insiders to serve in positions designated as outside and may potentially be susceptible to a similar fate.
171 See Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93. Although it is not the subject of this Comment to
address the ramifications of the changes to the Commercial Code concerning the board of directors, it is
necessary to briefly discuss them here to the extent that they relate to executive oversight issues.
172 Torikai Review, supra note 153.
173 id.
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with determining the compensation packages for each director and officer. 174
The auditing committee will select and dismiss outside auditors and also
monitor the performance of both directors and executive officers.175 Each of
these committees must consist of at least three members with a majority of
them being corporate outsiders and non-executives. 176 Additionally,
members of the auditing committee must be independent. 177
The result of the Amendment is a statutory framework that more
clearly separates the executive officers from the board of directors. In this
sense, the new system provides a workable framework for potentially more
effective oversight and improved decision-making processes. 178 The
framework contemplated by the Amendment, however, does not exist in a
vacuum and is therefore likely to be limited, perhaps severely, by a number
of legal and cultural obstacles.
V. THE AMENDMENT IS AN IMPORTANT EARLY STEP IN REFORMING
JAPAN'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, BUT WILL FALL SHORT
OF INSTITUTING SYSTEMIC REFORM
The Amendment is a direct result of a genuine shift in Japanese
corporate governance practices and represents one of the first key steps
towards a gradual reorienting of Japanese firms from stakeholder-based to
shareholder-centered. 79 By providing Japanese corporations with the option
to create a separate executive organ, the Amendment provides a framework
for a system potentially more efficient and more accountable to
shareholders.180 Nevertheless, the impact of the Amendment will likely be
hindered by flaws in the Amendment itself and the influence of already
entrenched Japanese business culture and practices.
:74 See Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93.
75 Id.
176 Torikai Review, supra note 153.
177 Id.
171 See discussion supra Part II.B.
179 Gregory Jackson, The Twilight of the Stakeholder Corporation? Germany's Relevance for Japan,
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ECONOMY TRADE AND INDUSTRY (Oct. 1, 2002), at http://www.rieti.
go.jp/en/colunns/aO1 0057.hnlI (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
"' Milhaupt, Symposium, supra note 79, at 2117-18.
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A. The Amendment Provides a Workable Framework upon Which
Meaningful Corporate Governance Reform Can Occur
The Amendment's statutory framework for the executive officer
system is capable by itself of improving board oversight decision and
shareholder value'18 for those corporations that make reform a priority.
From a structural standpoint, executive officers are a separate body under
the new arrangement and are subject to review and removal by the
independent auditing committee. 112 This arrangement should force
executives to be more accountable for their decisions and raise executive
responsiveness to shareholder interests vis-a-vis the board. Moreover,
because executive officers are no longer required to concurrently serve as
directors, they are no longer required, by definition, to have a vote on the
board. 183 If executives are no longer voting peers alongside directors, they
are likely to be more accountable to the directors as a body. These simple
realities may sever, or more likely, limit the power of hierarchy that once all
but eliminated the possibility of executive oversight.
These structural changes may also improve decision-making
efficiency.184 With executive officers separate from the board and therefore
free to make operational decisions, the decision-making process will be
streamlined. Moreover, by separating the board from the officers, officers
will be able to focus on and become more proficient at operational functions.
Sony's experience with corporate governance reform provides an
illustration of how the executive officer system may serve as a transitional
step towards better corporate governance models in the near future. 185
Sony's 1997 corporate governance reforms included a new organizational
format that structurally separated its executive officers from the board of
directors. 8 6 Sony also introduced several changes to its board of directors,
including the creation of several board committees and an increase in the
number of outside directors.187 Although Sony did retain its old directors as
'8 See JCGI, supra note 135, at 1.
182 See Torikai Review, supra note 153; see also Bringing in Outsiders, supra note 93.
183 See Torikai Review, supra note 153.
184 Id.
185 Potential problems with Sony's changes may also exist. See discussion infra Part V.B.3.
186 Takahashi, supra note 128, at 4-5. Sony also reduced the board size from thirty-eight to ten and
increased the number of outside directors to three in order to improve board oversight of the officers. Id.
Initially, Sony created twenty-seven officer positions but later increased that number to thirty-seven. Id.
Many of Sony's officers are former directors who were not fired, but rather were shifted into the role of
executive officer. Id. Finally, the chief executive and chief operating officers may concurrently hold
representative director positions. Id.
187 Takahashi, supra note 128, at 4-5.
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officers, this change was intended to effectuate the implementation of the
executive system, while helping to maintain the morale of the ex-
directors. '88 Recently, Sony announced that it has adopted the new
corporate governance provisions provided by the Amendment.1 89 Perhaps
other large firms will follow Sony's path and make similar transitions.
B. Legal and Cultural Obstacles Will Limit the Amendment's Impact
Despite the usefulness of the corporate governance framework
provided by the Amendment, a number of legal and cultural obstacles
promise to prevent it from serving as Japan's corporate governance panacea.
The optional nature of the Amendment, strong preference for Japanese
business practices, the persistence of corporate norms emphasizing hierarchy
and community, and renewed suspicion of American corporate institutions
following the recent wave of corporate scandals all stand as obstacles to
widespread adoption of the new system.
1. The Amendment's Optional Nature Will Limit Its Impact
One important obstacle to the widespread implementation of the
executive officer system is its optional nature.' 9° Since the Amendment is a
compromise measure designed to support implementation of the executive
officer system by some of Japan's largest multinational corporations,191 it
does not require all Japanese firms to adopt it. 92 While the statutory support
is undoubtedly important for those large multinational firms that have
already adopted the system (or will do so in the near term), its optional
nature frustrates it from generating change in Japan's most conservative
firms, as well as its smaller and/or primarily domestic firms. In a nation
where norms in corporate behavior tend to evolve slowly,193 this feature of
the Amendment may render it especially weak.
... Id. at 7.189 Sony Corporate Website, Reforming the Sony Group Management Structure to Strengthen
Corporate Governance (Jan. 28, 2003), http://www.sony.net/Sonylnfo/News/Press/200301/03-004E/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2003).
"' Michael Solomon Associates, Inc., supra note 90 (indicating that the initial proposal released for
comment in April, 2001 was mandatory for all large corporations, but was scrapped in favor of the optional
plan after heavy opposition from Japanese Big Business).
191 See discussion supra Part IV.
192 Torikai Review, supra note 153.
193 Milhaupt, Symposium, supra note 79, at 2102 (discussing how Japanese corporate governance
norms are "relatively impervious to change" because of the benefits they provided to various groups of
powerful, private companies); see also West, supra note 13, at 587-588 (arguing that changes in Japanese
law tend to come slowly and in response to shocks from outside sources).
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2. Japanese Business Leaders' Strong Preference for Japanese Models
Will Hinder Widespread and Systemic Adoption of American-Style
Models
A strong preference among business leaders for Japanese corporate
governance models is also a barrier to a wide-spread and systemic adoption
of the executive officer system. While difficult to quantify, positions taken
by some of Japan's most powerful business and political organizations
strongly imply this is the case. For instance, the Japan Federation of
Economic Organizations ("Keidanren")194 and the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party ("LDP") have shown their disfavor for substantive reform along
American lines. Rather than advocating for adoption of the executive
officer system, Keidanren proposed strengthening Japan's unique auditor
system.195 In response to Keidanren's concerns, the LDP's Judicial Affairs
Division's Subcommittee on the Commercial Code recommended nearly
identical changes in 1999.196 Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of Toyota Motor
Corp.197 seemed to voice the sentiment underlying these proposals when he
indicated in a 1999 keynote speech presented at the Nikkei Global
Management Forum, that American-style management techniques (such as
the executive officer system) are foreign to Japan and that their adoption is
unlikely to improve corporate performance.'
98
194 Poe et al., supra note 4, at 74. Keidanren is the most influential business organization in Japan,
and is known to be very conservative. Id. Traditionally, it has been dominated by Japanese Big Business
and has opposed reform measures that might provide greater external control. Id.
195 Takahashi, supra note 128, at 9 (indicating that one of Keidanren 's proposals was to strengthen
the auditor system by increasing the number of auditors and establishing new requirements designed to
ensure auditor independence).
'96 Id. at 9-10 (indicating that one such proposal was to provide that a majority of auditors be
outsiders and that each auditor's term of office be extended).
197 See, e.g. Goldstein, supra note 3 (indicating that Toyota is widely viewed as one of Japan's most
traditional "Japanese" firms).
"8 See Nikkei Global Management Forum, Are Western Methods the Solution? (July 11, 2002), at
http://nni.nikkei.co.jp/fr/Nikkei/ngmf/ngmf99/ngmf0O9.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003); see also David
Ibison, U.S. Scandals Go Down Well in Japan: Lauded Business Model Now Shown to be Flawed,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at 12 (quoting Osaka Mayor Takafumi Isomura as saying "You must do
things the proper Japanese way" in response to causes of a scandal in connection with Universal Studios'
Osaka theme park).
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3. Persistent Cultural Norms Will Limit the Amendment 's
Effectiveness
For those companies that do opt for the executive officer system,
cultural norms still threaten its effectiveness. Even though the Amendment
creates the executive officers as a separate corporate organ, a continuing
corporate emphasis on hierarchy within the "company community" 199
threatens to undercut its potency. To the extent that most executives
continue to be promoted from within the corporation, 200 it is likely that the
chief executive will retain the penultimate corporate powers of the former
representative director. Even if the chief executive is no longer titled
"representative director" but remains the functional equivalent, it is likely
that the unchecked power associated with that position will persist. Thus,
there may be a shifting of titles for corporations adopting the new system
without a genuine shift in practice.
Analysis of Sony's reforms from a different perspective indicates that
the Amendment may induce only cosmetic corporate governance changes
and mask persistent Japanese cultural traits of hierarchy and community that
limit their impact. 20 The supposedly improved oversight of Sony's board
continues to serve as a rubber stamp for the decisions of the inside director
majority, which sets the agenda in closed door meetings.20 2 Indeed, as of
July 1999, no item proposed by that group had been rejected by the full
board.20 3 As Sony President Nobuyuki Idei explained, "the management
meetings and the board of directors do not raise different opinions. ' 2°
Similarly, the fact that Sony merely shifted former directors to executive
officer positions0s indicates that they retained their hierarchical roles and
remained subordinate to the representative director. A ten-member board
dominated by insiders supervising thirty-seven insider executives hardly
instills faith in shareholders that it will not be beholden to the interests of its
individual members.
199 See generally, Shishido, supra note 63 (arguing that an informal company community based on
individual relationships and hierarchy actually govern and discipline the modem Japanese corporation).200 See KONO, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
201 Takahashi, supra note 128, at 7.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 id.
205 Id.
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4. The Recent Wave of American Corporate Scandals Will Limit
Adoption of the Executive Officer System
The recent spate of American corporate scandals has also renewed
distaste for American forms of business management. 206 American
executives such as Enron's Kenneth Lay, WorldCom's Scott Sullivan, and
Global Crossing's Gary Winnick, together received over US$ 750 million
while managing their companies into bankruptcy.2 °7 These executives are
part of a larger corporate heist in which the senior executives and directors
of the twenty-five biggest business collapses between 1999 and 2001 walked
away with US$ 3.3 billion in salary, bonuses and proceeds from the sale of
stock options. 20 8 Some Japanese business leaders have seized upon these
events as evidence that the American system is no better than Japan's at
preventing corruption and delivering shareholder value. 209 They are
prompted to question why Japan would want to adopt a system susceptible
to such horrendous abuse.
These arguments misconstrue the issue and ignore Japan's own
shortcomings. The goal of Japan's corporate governance reform is to restore
economic prosperity and international competitiveness. 210 Installing systems
that improve oversight are in the best interests of Japanese corporations and
the global market economy overall.211 Although America's corporate
governance shortcomings are undeniable, it is conceptually among the most
transparent and accountability-oriented in the world,2 12 and, unlike Japan,
the United States has moved swiftly to install corporate mechanisms
21designed to improve accountability and oversight. 13 The real question
Japanese business leaders should be prompted to ask is if such scandal can
occur in America, what action can we take to improve our own system?
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Amendment's impact will be a function of how
individual Japanese corporations view their role in an increasingly global
economy. Japanese firms now empowered by the Amendment to legally
206 Goldstein, supra note 3.
207 Cassidy, supra note 52, at 1.
201 Id. at 2.
209 Goldstein, supra note 3.
210 Hashimoto, supra note 151, at 10.
211 Witherell, supra note 132, at 8.
212 Id. (expressing doubt about how effective the system is in practice as opposed to "on paper").
213 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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adopt an American-style executive officer system or to retain the
conventional Japanese system must decide for themselves which cox orate
governance model will best serve their needs in the global economy.
Firms that compete for investor capital directly in various markets are
most likely to adopt the Amendment. To attract investors, these firms must
present themselves as a sound investment not only from a purely financial
perspective but also by demonstrating that their corporate governance
practices are transparent, efficient, and accountable. 215 To this end, the
Amendment's option to adopt an American-style executive officer system
provides the basic structure with which a firm can establish effective
corporate governance. Although the Amendment faces many obstacles,2 16 it
provides an option for Japanese firms to implement the system, adjust it to a
Japanese context, and cultivate a commitment to accountability and
shareholder interest. To the extent adopting firms promote these values,
they may percolate throughout corporate groups and industries and serve as
a catalyst for more widespread change.21 7
Conversely, firms who remain insulated by their main bank or who
are otherwise less dependent on competing for foreign capital are more
likely to retain the modified conventional system. If, in fact, firms adopting
the new system do succeed while conventional firms do not, an incentive
may emerge to adopt the system. Perhaps too, Japanese firms retaining the
conventional system will find extralegal methods of creating functional
oversight and improved decision-making. 18
For both of these groups, real barriers to effective implementation
exist.2 l9 The optional nature of the Amendment, strong preference for
Japanese business practices, the persistence of corporate norms emphasizing
hierarchy and community, and renewed suspicion of American corporate
institutions all stand as obstacles to systemic corporate governance reform.
But as the history of the American corporate law demonstrates, systemic
reform frequently takes time. From this perspective, the Amendment serves
as one of the first key steps taken by Japan to reform its corporate
governance practices, and to that end, it is a reason to be optimistic that
more change is on the horizon.
214 Hashimoto, supra note 151.
2 Poe et al., supra note 4, at 79.
216 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
217 Michael Solomon Associates, Inc., supra note 90, at 4.
21 Milhaupt, Relational Theory, supra note 20, at 4-9.
2 9 See discussion supra Part IV.B. and accompanying notes.
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